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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a framework for analyzing the role of financial factors as a source of
instability in small open economies. Our basic model is a dynamic open economy model with a
tradeable good produced with capital and a country-specific factor. We also assume that firms face
credit constraints, with the constraint being tighter at a lower level of financial development. A basic
implication of this model is that economies at an intermediate level of financial development are
more unstable than either very developed or very underdeveloped economies. This is true both in
the sense that temporary shocks have large and persistent effects and also in the sense that these
economies can exhibit cycles. Thus, countries that are going through a phase of financial
development may become more unstable in the short run. Similarly, full capital account
liberalization may destabilize the economy in economies at an intermediate level of financial
development: phases of growth with capital inflows are followed by collapse with capital outflows.
On the other hand, foreign direct investment does not destabilize.
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This paper introduces a framework for analyzing the role of ￿nancial factors as a source
of instability in small open economies. Our basic model is a dynamic open economy
model with a tradeable good produced with internationally mobile capital and a country-
speci￿c factor. Moreover, ￿rms face ￿nancial constraints: the amount they can borrow
is limited to ￿ times the amount of their current level of investible funds.1 A high ￿
then represents an e⁄ective and developed ￿nancial sector while a low ￿ represents an
underdeveloped one.
Our model can provide some answers to a number of important and rather basic
questions. First, we show that it is economies at an intermediate level of ￿nancial
development - rather than the very developed or underdeveloped - that are the most
unstable. This is true both in the sense that temporary shocks will have large and
persistent e⁄ects and also in the sense that these economies can exhibit stable limit
cycles. Thus, countries going through a phase of ￿nancial development may become
more unstable in the short run.
Second, the model allows us to examine the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization on the
stability of the macroeconomy. Once again it turns out that the interesting economies
are the ones at an intermediate level of ￿nancial development. In these economies, full
￿nancial liberalization (i.e., opening the domestic market to foreign capital ￿ ows) may
actually destabilize, inducing chronic phases of growth with capital in￿ ows followed by
collapse with capital ￿ ight. On the other hand, foreign direct investment never destabi-
lizes since foreign direct investors come in with their own credit￿ their ability to invest is
1The fact that ￿rm level cash-￿ ow is an important determinant of investment is now widely recognized
even in the context of economies like the U.S. which have excellent ￿nancial markets. (e.g., see Hubbard
(1998) or Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)).
3unrelated to the state of the domestic economy. Overall, this suggests that economies at
an intermediate stage of ￿nancial development should consider carefully how they liber-
alize their capital account. Allowing foreign direct investment while initially restricting
portfolio investment may sometimes be a reasonable approach.
Third, our model allows us to assess the macroeconomic e⁄ects of speci￿c shocks to
the ￿nancial sector such as overlending by banks (leading to a phase of bank failures)
or overreaction by investors to a change in fundamentals.2 Once again, our model
predicts these shocks to have their most persistent e⁄ects when ￿nancial markets are at
an intermediate stage of development.
The basic mechanism underlying our model is a combination of two forces: on one
side, greater investment leads to greater output and ceteris paribus, higher pro￿ts.
Higher pro￿ts improve creditworthiness and fuel borrowing that leads to greater in-
vestment. Capital ￿ ows into the country to ￿nance this boom. At the same time, the
boom in investment increases the demand for the country-speci￿c factor and raises its
price relative to the output good (unless the supply of that factor is extremely elastic).
This rise in input prices leads to lower pro￿ts and therefore, reduced creditworthiness,
less borrowing and less investment, and a fall in aggregate output. Of course, once in-
vestment falls all these forces get reversed and eventually initiate another boom. It is
this endogenous instability which causes shocks to have persistent e⁄ects and in more
extreme cases leads to limit cycles.
The reason why an intermediate level of ￿nancial development is important for this
result is easy to comprehend: at very high levels of ￿nancial development, most ￿rms￿
investment is not constrained by cash ￿ ow so shocks to cash ￿ ow are irrelevant. On
the other hand, at very low levels of ￿nancial development, ￿rms cannot borrow very
much in any case and therefore their response to cash-￿ ow shocks will be rather muted
2Perhaps as a consequence of herd behavior.
4- extra cash means more investment but only a little more. Therefore shocks will die
out without causing any great turmoil. It is then at intermediate levels of ￿nancial
development that shocks to cash ￿ ow will have an e⁄ect intense enough to be a source
of instability.
This last argument also helps us understand why opening the economy to foreign
capital may destabilize: essentially, the response of an economy with a closed capital
market to a cash ￿ ow shock is limited since only so much capital is available to entrepre-
neurs. Additional funding sources in an open economy potentially increases the response
to a shock and therefore the scope for volatility.
The basic mechanics of instability described here - an increase in input price leading
to a pro￿t squeeze and eventual output collapse - have been documented in a number
of countries. For example, in the years leading up to the crisis of the early 1980￿ s
in the Southern Cone countries, there is evidence that pro￿ts in the tradeable sector
sharply deteriorated due to a rise in domestic input prices (see Galvez and Tybout,
1985, Petrei and Tybout, 1985, or De Melo, Pascale and Tybout, 1985). Moreover, ample
anecdotal evidence supports the impact of ￿ competitiveness￿(e.g., a real appreciation)
on the ￿nancial conditions of ￿rms.
The dynamic impact of a liberalization predicted by the model is also consistent with
the experience of several emerging market countries that have liberalized, in particular
in Southeast Asia and Latin America, but also in some European countries. In the years
prior to their respective crises, these economies had been going through a process of rapid
￿nancial sector liberalization, which facilitated borrowing by domestic ￿rms. Partly as
a result of this liberalization, capital ￿ owed into these economies in large quantities,
allowing rapid growth in lending and a boom in investment. However, episodes of
large capital in￿ ows have often been associated with growing imbalances, such as a
5real currency appreciation3, an increase in real estate prices (e.g., see Guerra de Luna,
1997), or an increase in non-performing loans (see World Bank, 1997, p. 255). When the
crisis came, most of these forces got reversed - capital ￿ owed out, the currency collapsed,
real estate prices dropped, lending stopped, and investment collapsed.4
It is however important to emphasize that the goal of this paper is not to explain
exactly what happened in some particular country, but rather to propose a uni￿ed
macroeconomic framework that gives a central role to ￿nancial constraints and ￿nancial
development. There are certainly a number of strands of the existing literature antici-
pating a signi￿cant part of what we have done here. Gertler and Rogo⁄(1990) study an
open economy model with credit-market imperfections. However, they do not consider
business cycle ￿ uctuations.5 The idea that ￿nancial constraints on ￿rms can play a role
in the propagation of the business cycle was modeled in Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
Subsequent work by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999)
and Azariadis and Smith (1998) have shown that these constraints can lead to oscilla-
tions, though only in the context of a closed economy. However, none of these papers
study the e⁄ects of opening up the domestic ￿nancial sector to foreign capital ￿ ows and
none of them, except Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999), focus on the level of ￿nancial
development as a factor determining the extent of instability. While the model￿ s struc-
3See, for example, Calvo et al. (1996). The degree of real appreciation varies across countries; for
example, it has been more pronounced in Latin America than in Asia.
4See World Bank (1997) and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) for systematic descriptions of the link
between and capital ￿ ow reversals and currency crises. Gourinchas, ValdØs, and Landerretche (2001)
provide a systematic analysis of lending booms which coincide with movements in output, capital
in￿ ows, the current account and the real exchange rate that are fully consistent with our results. See
also Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) for an illuminating description of the Finnish crisis of the 1990￿ s,
which ￿ts well our analysis: ￿rst, an economic environment characterized by a large proportion of
credit-constrained enterprises, for which investments are highly elastic w.r.t. current pro￿ts; second, a
￿nancial market deregulation in the 1980￿ s that leads to a huge expansion of bank lending, to major
in￿ ows of foreign capital and to a sharp increase in real asset prices (in particular real estate prices)
during the boom; and subsequently in the 1990￿ s, a sharp fall in real asset prices, investments, and real
GDP, and the occurrence of a banking crisis that eventually led to a tightening of banking regulations
and to a devaluation of the Finnish currency after hopeless e⁄orts to maintain a ￿xed exchange rate.
5Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) distinguish between credit constraints from foreign investors
and constraints from domestic investors to explain the ampli￿cation of shocks in an open economy.
They also abstract from business ￿ uctuations issues.
6ture is in a spirit similar to Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999), this paper di⁄ers in
key respects. First, the economic mechanisms at work are of a di⁄erent nature. Second,
the economic questions and the types of policy shocks we focus on are entirely di⁄erent.
Finally, at a methodological level, unlike Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999) we show
that our results are robust to the introduction of forward-looking entrepreneurs.
A separate literature focuses on the case for free capital mobility. Policy interest
in the debate has been aroused by the recent, rather mixed, experience of a number
of countries that have liberalized their capital account.6 However, a number of impor-
tant aspects, including the implications of liberalization on volatility, have not been
widely studied.7 More importantly, none of these papers attempt to relate the e⁄ect of
liberalization to the functioning of the domestic ￿nancial sector.
Finally a number of recent papers stress that speci￿c shocks to the ￿nancial sector,
such as those brought on by policy mistakes, herd behavior, panics, or corruption in the
￿nancial sector, may lead to crises in the real economy. While accepting the validity
of these arguments, we feel these models su⁄er from ignoring some of the interactions
between the ￿nancial sector and the rest of the economy. As our model makes clear,
volatile behavior may arise even in the absence of such shocks; while on the other
hand, the presence of such shocks does not automatically imply they will have large and
persistent real e⁄ects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 represents the core of the paper, with
a description of a basic version of the open-economy model and a characterization of
the conditions under which macroeconomic volatility arises. Section 3 presents the
model under more general assumptions and provides numerical simulations to assess the
plausibility for volatility. Section 4 analyzes the impact of a capital account liberalization
6See, for example, Johnston et al. (1997) or Eichengreen et al. (1998).
7Obstfeld (1986), McKinnon (1993), Bacchetta (1992), Bartolini and Drazen (1997) analyze capital
account liberalizations. McKinnon and Pill (1997) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) are among
the ￿rst examining the issue of volatility.
7and contrasts the stabilizing e⁄ect of unrestricted FDI with the potentially destabilizing
e⁄ects of either foreign indirect investments or restricted foreign direct investments.
Section 5 describes various extensions and draws some tentative policy conclusions.
2 The Basic Mechanism
For pedagogical purposes we consider ￿rst a simple model with constant saving rates
and a Leontief technology involving a inelastic supply of the country-speci￿c factor.
In Section 3, we consider a more general model with three main extensions: ￿rst the
supply of domestic input is elastic; second, the production technology is more general ;
and third, saving decisions result from intertemporal utility maximization.
2.1 A Simple Framework
We consider a small open economy with a single tradeable good produced with capital
and a country-speci￿c factor. One should typically think of this factor as input services
such as (skilled) labor or real estate. We take the output good as the numeraire and
denote by p the price of the country-speci￿c factor when expressed in units of the output
good. The relative price p can also be interpreted as the real exchange rate. In this basic
framework we assume that the supply of the country-speci￿c factor is inelastic and equal
to Z.
For the sake of presentation, in this subsection we also assume that all agents save
a ￿xed fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of their total end-of-period wealth and thus consume a ￿xed
fraction ￿: The intertemporal decisions of lenders are of no consequence for output in
such an open economy since investors can borrow in international capital markets. They
will, however, a⁄ect net capital ￿ ows.8
8Notice that the separation between the decisions of lenders and entrepreneurs does not imply
separation between total national savings and investment. Gertler and Rogo⁄ (1990) show that a
framework with credit constraints can explain the high correlation between total savings and investment
(Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). We obtain a similar result in our framework. However, in general this
result also depends on lenders￿savings behavior.
8There are two distinct categories of individuals in the economy. First, the lenders,
who cannot directly invest in production, but can lend their initial wealth endowments
at the international market-clearing interest rate r. Second, the entrepreneurs (or bor-
rowers) who have the opportunity to invest in production. There is a continuum of
lenders and borrowers and their number is normalized to one for both categories.
Output y is given by the following production function:
y = min(
K
a
;z); (1)
where 1=a > r, i.e., we assume that productivity is larger than the world interest rate.
K denotes the current level of capital and z denotes the level of the country-speci￿c
input. With perfect capital markets, investment would simply be determined by the
international interest rate r.
Credit-market imperfections: Due to standard agency (moral hazard) considerations,
an entrepreneur with initial wealth W B can borrow at most ￿W B. The presence of
capital market imperfections implies that entrepreneurs cannot borrow up to the net
present value of their project; they can only borrow an amount proportional to their
current cash-￿ ow (as in Bernanke-Gertler (1989)). The proportionality coe¢ cient, or
credit multiplier ￿ > 0, re￿ ects the level of ￿nancial development in the domestic
economy. In the extreme case where ￿ = 0, the credit market collapses and investors
can only invest their own wealth. Higher values of ￿ correspond to higher levels of
￿nancial development.
A simple justi￿cation for relating the capital market to the level of ￿nancial develop-
ment and basing it on moral hazard by the borrower, can be found in Holmstrom-Tirole
(1996) and in Aghion-Banerjee-Piketty (1999). In general ￿ will depend on the rate of
interest being charged, which in turn implies a constant credit multiplier in a model
where the interest rate is given by the world capital markets. However, in section 4 and
the Appendix we compare our basic model with a model with a closed capital market
9where the interest rate is endogenously determined by domestic investment demand and
domestic savings supply. Yet, for convenience, we shall maintain the assumption of a ￿
that does not depend on the interest rate in that section as well. As shown in Aghion-
Banerjee-Piketty (1999), this corresponds to a particular parametrization of the more
general model of the credit market presented in that paper. Our results would only be
stronger if we allowed the usual negative relation between the interest rate and ￿.9
Production decision: Denote by L the amount borrowed. The funds available to an
entrepreneur with total initial wealth W B are I = W B +L. When the credit constraint
is binding, I = (1 + ￿)W B. Entrepreneurs will choose the level of the country-speci￿c
factor z, with corresponding investment K = I￿p￿z, to maximize current pro￿ts. Given
the above Leontief technology, the optimum involves z = K
a ; so that:
I ￿ p ￿ z = a ￿ z (2)
Depending on the level of entrepreneurs￿wealth, there are three cases:
i) Binding credit constraint and p = 0. W B is low so that the credit constraint
is binding (L = ￿W B) and K
a < Z. In this case, there is an excess supply of the
country-speci￿c input. This immediately gives us p = 0: Output at date t is then given
by:
yt =
Kt
a
=
1
a
(1 + ￿)W
B
t :
ii) Binding credit constraint and p > 0. W B is low so that L = ￿W B, but K
a ￿ Z.
Thus, there is excess demand for the immobile factor. Therefore p > 0 and output is
determined in equilibrium by the supply of the country-speci￿c input: yt = Z: From (2)
and the de￿nition of I, the equilibrium price of the country-speci￿c input is given by:
pt =
(1 + ￿)W B
t ￿ aZ
Z
: (3)
9>From Aghion-Banerjee-Picketty, we ￿nd ￿ = 1=(1 ￿ ￿=ac), where ￿ is the cost of cheating for
the borrower and c is proportional to the debt collection cost in case of default for the lender. With a
higher level of ￿nancial development, ￿ is larger and c smaller. This implies that ￿ is larger.
10Notice that in this case the entrepreneur￿ s entire wealth is invested in the domestic
technology since it has returns higher than the world interest rate, i.e., y￿rL > rW B.10
iii) Unconstrained entrepreneurs. W B is large enough so that L < ￿W B. As in ii),
p > 0 and yt = Z, but p is not a⁄ected by the level of investment. When W B is large,
entrepreneurs borrow until pro￿ts equal the international interest rate: y ￿ rL = rW B,
i.e., until y = rI. This determines the maximum price level. Hence, I = Z=r so that
the price is given by:
pt =
1
r
￿ a:
The equilibrium price pt, i.e., the real exchange rate, which is a positive function of
W B; is the key variable whose movements over time will produce volatility.
The Timing of Events: The timing of events within each period t is the following.
Investment, borrowing and lending, and the payment of the country-speci￿c factor ser-
vices p ￿ Z by entrepreneurs to the owners of that factor, take place at the beginning of
the period (which we denote by t￿). Everything else occurs at the end of the period
(which we denote by t+): the returns to investments are realized; borrowers repay their
debt, rL, to lenders; and ￿nally, agents make their consumption and savings decisions
determining in turn the initial wealth of borrowers at the beginning of the next period
(i.e., at (t + 1)￿):
Dynamic Equations: Now that we have laid out the basic model, we can analyze the
aggregate dynamics of the economy and in particular investigate why open economies
with imperfect credit markets may experience macroeconomic volatility. Since both I
and p depend on entrepreneurs￿wealth W B, output does too. Thus, output dynamics are
determined by the evolution of entrepreneurs￿behavior. Let W B
t+1 denote the disposable
wealth of entrepreneurs (borrowers) at the beginning of period t + 1: The dynamic
10Using y = Z and L = ￿WB, this inequality can be written as Z > (1 + ￿)rWB. Using (3), this
implies 1
a+p > r. This holds for p not too large since 1=a > r. When p is large enough that this
inequality does not hold, we are in case iii).
11evolution of W B (and therefore of investment and total output) between two successive
periods is simply described by the equation:
W
B
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[e + yt ￿ r￿W
B
t ] (4)
where e is an exogenous income in terms of output goods, yt = min
￿
I
a;Z
￿
is output
in period t (also equal to the gross revenues of entrepreneurs during that period). The
expression in brackets is the net end-of-period t revenue of entrepreneurs. The net
disposable wealth of entrepreneurs at the beginning of period t + 1 is what remains of
this net end-of-period return after consumption, hence the multiplying factor (1￿￿) on
the right-hand-side of equation (4).
Entrepreneurs invest and borrow only if their pro￿ts are larger than or equal to the
international return. When ￿ or W B are large, entrepreneurs invest only up the point
where y￿rL = rW B: Any remaining wealth is invested at the international market rate.
In this case, no pure pro￿ts are earned from production and the evolution of wealth is
simply given by:
W
B
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[e + rW
B
t ]: (5)
Thus, the dynamics are fully described either by di⁄erence equation (4) or by di⁄er-
ence equation (5).
2.2 Volatility
When the dynamic evolution of domestic entrepreneurs￿wealth is described by equation
(4), an increase in entrepreneurs￿wealth W B
t at the beginning of period t has an am-
biguous e⁄ect on next period￿ s wealth W B
t+1. This is due to the fact that the amount of
invested wealth itself depends negatively on the input price p, whilst p depends positively
on current wealth. Using the fact that:
(a + pt)yt = (1 + ￿)W
B
t ;
12we have:
dyt
dW B
t
=
(1 + ￿)
a + pt
￿
yt
a + pt
@pt
@W B
t
:
Then, from (4), the impact of last period wealth on current end of period wealth can be
decomposed into two e⁄ects:
dW B
t+1
dW B
t
= (1 ￿ ￿)[
1 + ￿
a + pt
￿ r￿
| {z }
wealth e⁄ect
￿
yt
a + pt
@pt
@W B
t
]
| {z }
price e⁄ect
On the one hand, there is a positive wealth e⁄ect of current wealth on future wealth:
for a given price of the country-speci￿c factor pt; a higher inherited wealth W B
t from
period (t ￿ 1) means a higher level of investment (1 + ￿)W B
t in period t which, all else
equal, should produce higher revenues and thus higher wealth W B
t+1 at the beginning
of period t + 1: On the other hand, there is a negative price e⁄ect of current wealth
on future wealth: more investment in period t also implies a greater demand for the
country-speci￿c factor to thus raise its price pt during that period. This, in turn, has a
detrimental e⁄ect on period t revenues and therefore on the wealth W B
t+1at the beginning
of period t + 1:
With the above Leontief speci￿cation, the price e⁄ect is eliminated whenever the
current wealth W B
t is so small that current investment cannot absorb the total supply
of the country-speci￿c factor. In this case pt ￿ 0 and:
W
B
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[e + f
1 + ￿
a
￿ r￿gW
B
t ]; (6)
so that dW B
t+1=dW B
t > 0:
On the other hand, the price e⁄ect dominates when the current wealth W B
t is suf-
￿ciently large that current investment exhausts the total supply of the country-speci￿c
factor. In this case, we simply have:
W
B
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[e + Z ￿ r￿W
B
t ]; (7)
so that dW B
t+1=dW B
t < 0.
13[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 shows the relationship between W B
t+1 and W B
t in this basic Leontief setup.
This relationship is represented by three segments corresponding to the three cases
described in 2.1. The ￿rst one is the upward sloping curve described by (6) for W <
W = aZ
1+￿; this is the case where the wealth e⁄ect dominates as p = 0: The second
segment, for W < W < W = Z
(1+￿)r; is described by (7); in this case, the price e⁄ect
always dominates. Finally, the third segment (W > W) represents equation (5) where
entrepreneurs are not credit-constrained. As drawn in the ￿gure, the 45￿ line intersects
the W B
t+1(W B
t ) curve at the point c W which lies in the second segment. This intersection
can also be in either of the other two segments. It will be in the ￿rst segment when
(1￿￿)e
1￿(1￿￿)f
1+￿
a ￿r￿g, the ￿xed point of equation (6); is less than W: Since
(1￿￿)e
1￿(1￿￿)f
1+￿
a ￿r￿g is
increasing in ￿ while W is decreasing, it is clear that this can only happen when ￿ is
very small. On the other hand, the intersection will be in the third segment when the
￿xed point of equation (5),
(1￿￿)e
1￿(1￿￿)r > W = Z
(1+￿)r: This will only happen when ￿ is
su¢ ciently large. For intermediate values of ￿, corresponding to an intermediate level of
￿nancial development, the case is depicted in Figure 1, the one case where the economy
does not converge monotonically to its steady state.
In this case there are two possibilities￿ short run ￿uctuations, represented by oscilla-
tions that eventually converge to the steady state, c W; and long run volatility, represented
by a system which does not converge to a steady state but instead continues to oscillate
forever. A necessary condition for the existence of such a limit cycle is that the steady
state at c W be unstable, true only when the slope of the W B
t+1(W B
t ) schedule at c W is less
than -1, corresponding to when c W lies in the second segment of that schedule. Thus,
for long run volatility to occur, we must have W < c W < W and ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿r < ￿1:
If these conditions hold, one can easily derive additional su¢ cient conditions un-
der which long-run volatility actually occurs. For example, a two-cycle (W1;W2) will
14satisfy:11
W1 =
(1 ￿ ￿)(e + Z)
1 + r￿(1 ￿ ￿)2(e +
1+￿
a ￿ r￿)
; W2 =
(1 ￿ ￿)2(e +
1+￿
a ￿ r￿)(e + Z)
1 + r￿(1 ￿ ￿)2(e +
1+￿
a ￿ r￿)
with W1 < W < W2 < W. This two-cycle will be stable whenever (1￿￿)2r￿(
1+￿
a ￿r￿) <
1: Conditions for the existence of longer (and more plausible) cycles can be derived using
standard techniques. The dynamic simulations will show that the ￿ uctuations can be
complex since wealth can ￿ uctuate between the constrained (the ￿rst two segments in
Figure 1) and the unconstrained (the third segment) regions.
Intuitively, the basic mechanism underlying this cyclicality can be described as fol-
lows: during a boom the demand for the domestic country-speci￿c factor goes up as
(high yield) investments increase, thus raising its price. This higher price will eventually
squeeze investors￿borrowing capacity and therefore the demand for country-speci￿c fac-
tors. At this point, the economy experiences a slump and two things occur: the relative
price of the domestic factor collapses, while a fraction of the factor available remains
unused since there is not enough investment. The collapse in the factor price thus cor-
responds to a contraction of real output. Of course, the low factor price will eventually
lead to higher pro￿ts and therefore to more investment. A new boom then begins.
The reason why the level of ￿nancial development matters is also quite intuitive:
economies at a low level of ￿nancial development have low levels of investment and do
not generate enough demand to push up the price of the country speci￿c factor while
economies at a very high level of development have su¢ cient demand for that factor to
keep its price positive.
11This follows immediately from the equations:
W1 = (1 ￿ ￿)(e + Z ￿ r￿W2)
W2 = (1 ￿ ￿)(e +
1 + ￿
a
￿ r￿)W1:
152.3 Discussion
Although the above framework is extremely simple, it generates a number of predic-
tions for empirical analysis on emerging markets. In particular, our model predicts: (i)
that the investment to GDP and private credit to GDP ratios should increase during a
￿ lending boom￿ ;12 (ii) that lending booms are times of net capital in￿ ows; (iii) that the
real exchange rate (pt in our model) should increase during a lending boom; (iv) that
the fraction of defaulting loans should increase towards the end of a lending boom (in a
straightforward extension of our model with uncertainty and defaults, which we develop
in section 5.1 below). Recent work by Gourinchas, ValdØs, and Landerretche (2001)
provides an interesting cross-country study of lending booms and examine the pattern
of a set a macroeconomic indicators around these booms.13 The behavior of these in-
dicators is shown to be fully consistent with the above predictions. In particular, by
comparing with ￿ tranquil periods￿ , Gourinchas et al. show that during lending booms
the output gap is higher, the investment/GDP ratio increases, the proportion of short
term debt increases, the current account worsens, the real exchange rate appreciates,
especially at the end of the boom period. When lending declines, all these movements
are reversed. In particular, the fact that investment follows a credit expansion and is
sharply procyclical is fully consistent with our approach.
The above model is very simple, but simplicity and tractability always come at a
cost. In particular, the analysis has been drastically simpli￿ed by assuming a Leontief
technology, a constant savings rate, and an inelastic supply of the non-tradeable input.
In the next section we relax these three assumptions. Moreover, in the concluding section
12In the context of the above model, we have:
It
yt
= a + pt;
which indeed increases during a lending boom as a result of the price e⁄ect.
13See also Tornell and Westermann (2002).
16we discuss mechanisms that lead to a procyclical ￿ and therefore amplify the underlying
volatility.
An important question is whether the basic mechanism leading to volatility depends
on the assumption of discrete time. It is well known that volatility occurs more easily
under discrete time. However, it is not di¢ cult to show that a similar mechanism can
occur under continuous time. First, this can happen with a system of two di⁄erential
equations. For example, if domestic lenders are also workers paid by the entrepreneurs
and use the local input for their consumption, then a second dynamic equation describ-
ing the evolution of domestic lenders￿wealth must be added to the dynamic equation
describing the evolution of domestic entrepreneurs￿wealth. If domestic lenders￿demand
for the local input is not too price elastic, we still get the same type of volatility as in
the basic model with a single di⁄erence equation. Second, Bruchez (2001) shows that if
the lags between the wealth realization in period t and the wealth investment in period
t+1 di⁄er across ￿rms, equation (4) becomes an ordinary di⁄erential equation that can
also exhibit periodic solutions.14
3 Assessing Plausibility: Some Simulation Results
The main purpose of this section is to ask whether the analytical conclusions derived
in the previous section are empirically plausible. The simulation results are again fo-
cused on the possibility of - and the conditions for - long run volatility in economies at
intermediate levels of ￿nancial development.15
We shall ￿rst extend our basic model in three respects: ￿rst, we allow for elastic
supply of the non-tradable factor; second, we replace the Leontief technology by a more
14This result obtains when the discrete lags are randomly gamma distributed, as shown in Invernizzi
and Medio (1991)
15When looking at the real world, the distinction between persistent oscillations that eventually die
out, and those that never die out, may not be so important as our analysis suggests. This is because in
reality, even if oscillations eventually die out, there are always shocks that start them o⁄ again.
17general CES technology, thereby allowing for substitutability between the tradable and
non-tradable factors; third, we replace the constant savings rate assumption of the basic
model with intertemporal utility maximization by entrepreneurs. The implications of
each of these, are analyzed in detail in Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001b). Our
main conclusion there is that for endogenous ￿ uctuations to obtain in equilibrium, we
need: (i) enough inelasticity in the supply of the non-tradable input; (ii) enough com-
plementarity between the two inputs; (iii) a su¢ ciently low intertemporal elasticity of
substitution between current and future consumption. In the simulations presented in
this section, the three extensions are being simultaneously considered.
3.1 Generalizing our framework
We modify our previous model by assuming:
1. Elastic Supply of the Country-Speci￿c Factor: we relax the assumption of a ￿xed
supply of the country-speci￿c factor and assume that Z is instead produced by
(domestic) lenders using the tradeable good at a cost c(Z) = ’Z￿, where ￿ > 1.
Maximization of a domestic lender￿ s pro￿t pZ ￿’Z￿, yields the optimal supply of
the country-speci￿c factor:
Z =
￿
p
’￿
￿ 1
￿￿1
: (8)
2. CES Technology: we replace the Leontief technology by a CES production function,
with f(K;z) = A(K￿ + ￿z￿)1=￿, with A > r and ￿ > 0.16 The parameter ￿
determines the elasticity of substitution between K and z (we assume ￿ < 1
for concavity). This CES speci￿cation includes as special cases, both the Cobb-
Douglas technology when ￿ = 0; and a Leontief technology when ￿ ! ￿1.
16This is to make sure that it pays to produce at least some times and that the country-speci￿c factor
is used.
183. Optimal Savings by Entrepreneurs: we replace the constant savings rate assump-
tion in our basic model by the assumption that entrepreneurs are in￿nitely-lived
and maximize their net present utility of consumption, with instantaneous utility
being given by: u(CB) = CB(1￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿), where 1=￿ is the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution and ￿ > 0. Then domestic entrepreneurs solve:
max
1 X
t=0
￿
tu(C
B
t ) s:t: C
B
t = ￿t ￿ W
B
t+1
The ￿rst order conditions for this problem give us:
CB
t+1
CB
t
= (￿Mt+1)
1
￿ (9)
where Mt = ￿t=W B
t . It is clear from equation (9) that the ratio
CB
t+1
CB
t approaches 1
as ￿ increases. This implies that an increase in ￿ (a reduction in the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution) reduces consumption changes and gives correspondingly larger
intertemporal savings changes, i.e., savings become more pro-cyclical over time. This,
in turn, will tend to amplify the cycle as the price of the country-speci￿c input increases
more sharply during a boom. True, to the extent that the returns to savings are higher
when the economy is in a slump (slumps are typically followed by periods with high
investment pro￿tability), there should be a greater tendency to save more in a slump,
thereby attenuating the cyclical variations. However, this latter e⁄ect is weaker, the
higher the cost of intertemporal substitution (i.e., with a larger ￿).17
17To assess the overall e⁄ect of a change in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution on volatility,
it is instructive to replace CB
t by ￿t ￿ WB
t in (9), giving a dynamic relationship:
WB
t+1 =
(￿Mt+1)
1
￿
Mt+1 + (￿Mt+1)
1
￿
￿t +
1
Mt+1 + (￿Mt+1)
1
￿
WB
t+2
Entrepreneurs￿wealth available for next period is now a weighted average of past pro￿ts and expected
future wealth. While this second order (highly non-linear) di⁄erence equation does not lend itself to
analytical solutions, it can be resolved numerically as we show in the next subsection.
193.2 Simulations
We present our simulation results by successively varying three parameters: i) the elas-
ticity of substitution between capital and the other factor in the production function,
measured by ￿; ii) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1=￿; (iii) the elasticity of
country-speci￿c factor supply as measured by ￿: The other parameters are taken to be
constant in these simulations, and we ￿x them at empirically plausible values. We set
the gross interest rate r = 1:02 and the productivity factor A = 1:5. Whenever it is
fully inelastic we set the total supply of the immobile factor Z = 100 and its weight
in the production function ￿ = 1 (these two parameters have little in￿ uence on the
simulation results). The discount rate of entrepreneurs is ￿ = 0:9; a value implying
that domestic entrepreneurs are impatient relative to the interest rate. Finally, we set
the credit multiplier ￿ = 4; a value implying a cash ￿ ow-capital ratio of 0:2 when ￿rms
are credit-constrained, a plausible number even for US ￿rms (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988)). The values considered for ￿ lie between ￿0:5 and ￿4; those for ￿ lie
between 4:33 and 7:66 corresponding to elasticities (1=(￿￿1)) of 15 and 30 percent; and
those for ￿ are between 0:5 and 10. In all simulations, we assume e = 0.
In each case, we consider the dynamic impact on output of a negative shock that
makes wealth fall by 1% below the steady-state wealth. We normalize output so that it
is initially equal to 100 and we look at the dynamic evolution of output over 30 periods
after the shock. Figures 2 and 3c and 3d display the simulations in the log utility case
where ￿ = 1. It can easily be shown (see the working paper version) that this case is
equivalent to the constant savings rate economy analyzed in the previous section.18
Figure 2 presents the log utility case with a ￿xed supply of the country speci￿c factor.
18Note that the simulation technique di⁄ers between the constant savings rate case and the log-utility
case with in￿nitely lived and forward-looking entrepreneurs. In the former case, we simply need to run a
￿rst order di⁄erence equation with given initial wealth level. In the latter case, as shown in footnote 17,
the dynamic system is described by a forward-looking second order di⁄erence equation which requires
that we compute the initial consumption level for given initial wealth (e.g., using a shooting algorithm).
When ￿ = 1, however, the two methods generate exactly the same dynamics.
20The diagrams show four cases corresponding to di⁄erent values of input substitutability
￿, each leading to a di⁄erent dynamic path. In Figure 2a, where ￿ = ￿0:5, there is no
instability and output converges smoothly to its initial level. When ￿ decreases to ￿1:5
(Figure 2b), output still converges but includes oscillations.
Figure 2c shows a two-cycle, which arises when ￿ = ￿2. Finally, when ￿ = ￿4
(Figure 2d), more complex dynamics arise due to ￿ regime switching￿ : large increases in
wealth lead the system to the unconstrained region (the third segment in Figure 1), but
the system returns to the constrained region since ￿r < 1. Notice that the ￿ uctuations
in 2c and 2d are larger than the initial shock, so that small shocks are ampli￿ed (actually
in￿nitesimal shocks would lead to similar ￿ uctuations).
In Figures 3a and 3b, we assume that ￿ = ￿4 with an inelastic supply of the country-
speci￿c factor, while we depart from log utility by varying the intertemporal elasticity
parameter ￿. With a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ￿ = 10, the system
tends to be even more unstable and switches more easily across regimes. When entre-
preneurs are more ready to substitute intertemporally, which in this ￿gure corresponds
to the case where ￿ = 0:5, regime switches are less frequent. The most important con-
clusion from Figure 3, however, is that the long-run instability results established under
constant savings rates (or with optimal intertemporal savings in the log utility case),
carry over to a wide range of elasticities of intertemporal substitution.
Finally, in Figures 3c and 3d we show simulations with an elastic supply of the
country-speci￿c factor, assuming ￿ = ￿4 and log utility. Obviously, with an elastic
supply there is less scope for ￿ uctuations. For example, Figure 3d shows that with a
supply elasticity of 30 percent ￿ uctuations die out rapidly. However, with an elasticity
of 15 percent, which appears reasonable in the short run, we still have ￿ uctuations with
a two-cycle.
Thus, even though our model is highly stylized, long-run output volatility and/or
21large ampli￿cation of shocks occur for empirically reasonable parameter values and are
not con￿ned to one particular functional form.
4 Financial Liberalization and Instability
The previous analysis shows that a fully open economy with imperfect credit markets
can exhibit volatility or a cycle. We show in this section that the same economy can be
stable if it is closed to capital ￿ ows or if only foreign investment (FDI) is allowed. Thus,
a full liberalization to capital movements may destabilize an economy: while it stabilizes
the real interest rate, it also ampli￿es the ￿ uctuations in the price of the country-speci￿c
factor. This in turn, increases the volatility in ￿rms￿cash-￿ ows and therefore aggregate
output. We ￿rst consider the case of an economy that opens up to foreign lending.
Then, we examine the case of FDI, where foreign investors are equity holders and are
fully informed about domestic ￿rms. Even though the results are valid with general
production functions, we present the Leontief case for pedagogical reasons.
4.1 Liberalizing Foreign Lending
We consider an economy with low domestic savings, with the Leontief technology spec-
i￿ed in Section 2.1, and we ￿rst assume that this economy is not open to foreign bor-
rowing and lending (this closed economy is described in details in Appendix A). In that
case, at each date, the current wealth of domestic lenders W L matters since domestic
investment is constrained by domestic savings W B + W L. Now suppose that the initial
levels of wealth held by entrepreneurs and domestic lenders, W B and W L respectively,
are su¢ ciently small so that initially p0 = 0 This corresponds to a situation where do-
mestic entrepreneurs cannot exhaust the supply of country-speci￿c inputs. Let us also
assume that at date 0 domestic savings W B
0 +W L
0 are less than the investment capacity
22(1+￿)W B
0 .19 If ￿ > 1 there will then be excess investment capacity in following periods
as long as pt remains equal to zero. To see this, note that the domestic interest rate
rt, determined in a closed economy by the comparison between W L
t and ￿W B
t ; is such
that entrepreneurs are indi⁄erent between borrowing and lending, that is: rt = 1
a in the
Leontief case. Therefore, if pt = 0 and W L
t < ￿W B
t ; we have:
W
B
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[e +
1
a
W
B
t ]
and W
L
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[e +
1
a
W
L
t ];
so that W L
t < ￿W B
t implies that: W L
t+1 < ￿W B
t+1 and therefore rt+1 = 1
a: In Appendix
A we provide su¢ cient conditions under which pt = 0 and rt = 1
a for all t: Under these
conditions, entrepreneurs￿wealth will grow as the (low) rate 1￿￿
a , since it is constrained
by the (low) level of domestic savings, and the W B
t+1(W B
t ) schedule will intersect the 450
line on its ￿rst branch along which pt = 0: This, in turn, implies that there will be no
persistent ￿ uctuations in this closed economy.
What happens if this economy is fully opened up to foreign borrowing and lending?
The interest rate will be ￿xed at the international level r: By itself, this could only help
stabilize any closed economy that otherwise might (temporarily) ￿ uctuate in reaction to
interest rate movements. However, the opening up of the economy to foreign lending also
brings net capital in￿ ows as investors satisfy their excess funds demand in international
capital markets. The corresponding rise in borrowing in turn increases the scope for bid-
ding up the price of the country-speci￿c factor, thereby inducing permanent ￿ uctuations
in p, W B and aggregate output.
Figure 4 presents an illustration of a liberalization in the Leontief case. The wealth
schedule shifts up after a capital account liberalization. d W B refers to the stable steady-
state level of borrowers￿wealth before the economy opens up to foreign borrowing and
19If ￿WB < WL; opening up the economy to foreign lending would make no di⁄erence: since the
investment capacity of domestic entrepreneurs cannot even absorb domestic savings, there is no need
for foreign lending in this case.
23lending. After the liberalization W B progressively increases as capital in￿ ows allow
investors to increase their borrowing, investments and pro￿ts. During the ￿rst two
periods following the liberalization, the demand for the country-speci￿c factor remains
su¢ ciently low that p = 0. In period 3 (at W B
3 ) p increases, but we still have growth.
However, in period 4 (at W B
4 ) the price e⁄ect of the liberalization becomes su¢ ciently
strong as to squeeze investors￿net worth, thereby bringing on a recession. At that
point, aggregate lending drops, capital ￿ ows out and the real exchange depreciates (p
drops). The resulting gain in competitiveness allows ￿rms to rebuild their net worth
so that growth can eventually resume. The economy ends up experiencing permanent
￿ uctuations of the kind described in the previous section.
We should stress that the dynamics in Figure 4 occurs only for intermediate levels of
￿nancial development. As we argued in Section 2, with a large ￿ there is no volatility in
an open economy, as it is the third segment of the curve that cuts the 45￿ line.20 When
￿ = 0, ￿nancial opening will not help investment and no capital in￿ ow will occur, so
there will be no upward pressure on the price of the country-speci￿c input.21 The above
example therefore suggests that it might be desirable for a country to increase its ￿, i.e.,
to develop its domestic ￿nancial sector before fully opening up to foreign lending.
4.2 Foreign Direct Investment
Whilst a full liberalization to foreign lending can have destabilizing e⁄ects on economies
with intermediate levels of ￿nancial development, those economies are unlikely to become
volatile as a result of opening up to foreign direct investment alone. We distinguish FDI
from other ￿nancial ￿ ows by assuming that it is part of ￿rms￿equity and that FDI
investors have full information about ￿rms.22 Furthermore, we ￿rst concentrate on the
20When several developed countries did liberalize their capital movements in the 1970s and 1980s
periods of high instability could not be observed.
21This may be the case in some of the poorer African and Asian countries.
22Typically, measured FDI implies participations of more than 10% in a ￿rm￿ s capital so this appears
to be a reasonable assumption. Razin et al (1998) make a similar distinction about FDI.
24benchmark case where the supply of FDI is in￿nitely elastic at some ￿xed price greater
than the world interest rate, say equal to r + ￿.23
Starting from a situation in which domestic cash ￿ ows are small so that domestic
investment cannot fully absorb the supply of country-speci￿c factors, foreign direct in-
vestors are likely to enter in order to pro￿t from the low price of the country-speci￿c
factors. This price will eventually increase and may even ￿ uctuate as a result of FDI.
But these price ￿ uctuations will only a⁄ect the distribution of pro￿ts between domestic
and foreign investors, not aggregate output. For example, in the Leontief case with
FDI, aggregate output will stabilize at a level equal to the supply of factor resources
Z, whereas the same economy may end up being destabilized if fully open to foreign
portfolio investment (i.e., to foreign lending).
Consider a closed Leontief economy open to foreign direct investment only. Assume
also that W L is large enough so that ￿rms can still borrow their desired amount domesti-
cally (otherwise investment is still constrained by savings and the scope for ￿ uctuations
is much smaller). Then FDI will ￿ ow into the economy as long as the rate of return
on that investment remains greater than or equal to r + ￿. Thus, if F denotes the net
in￿ ow of direct investment, in equilibrium we obtain the free-entry condition:
F > 0 ) R = r + ￿;
where R =
y￿e rL
WB+F is the net rate of return on foreign direct investment and e r is the
domestic interest rate. If domestic savings are less than the investment capacity of
domestic entrepreneurs (i.e., W L < ￿W B), we would have e r = 1
a: However, as domestic
savings exceed the investment capacity of domestic entrepreneurs, e r = ￿, where ￿ is
the return of an alternative, ine¢ cient, storing technology (as in Aghion, Banerjee, and
Piketty (1999)). In a closed economy, lenders will invest their excess savings in this
23This, in turn, implies that in our model FDI is a substitute to domestic investment. The e⁄ects
of FDI on macroeconomic volatility when domestic and foreign investments are complementary, are
discussed at the end of this section.
25technology.
Assume that R > r +￿ as long as p = 0 (this implies r +￿ < 1
a(1+￿)￿￿￿), so that
there will be a positive ￿ ow of FDI as long as p = 0. Using the fact that L = ￿(W B+F)
and that y = Z when p > 0, we can rewrite the above free-entry condition as:
(r + ￿)(W
B + F) = Z ￿ ￿￿(W
B + F):
This, together with the price equation (3), implies that:
p =
1 + ￿
r + ￿ + ￿￿
￿ a;
which in turn gives a stable value for p. Thus, even though FDI leads to a price increase
it does not generate price and output volatility.
Consider now an economy which has already been opened up to foreign borrowing
and lending at rate r, that is to foreign portfolio ￿ ows only, and which, as a result
has become volatile as in the example depicted in Figure 4. What will happen if this
economy is now also opening up to FDI? By the same reasoning as before, opening up
to FDI will stabilize the price of the country-speci￿c factor at level p￿ such that:
(r + ￿)(W
B + F) = Z ￿ r￿(W
B + F):
This again will eliminate investment and output volatility in this economy (assuming
that initially the country is attracting FDI). In other words, if there are no limitations
on FDI in￿ ows and out￿ ows (and FDI involves complete information on domestic ￿rms),
the price of the country-speci￿c factor and therefore aggregate domestic GDP or GNP
will remain constant in equilibrium.
The reason why FDI acts as a stabilizing force is again that, unlike foreign lending,
it does not depend on the creditworthiness of the domestic ￿rms, and furthermore it
is precisely during slumps that foreign direct investors may prefer to come in so as to
bene￿t from the low price of the country-speci￿c factor.
26What happens if foreign direct investment is complementary to domestic direct in-
vestment, that is, to W B? Such complementarity may be due to legal restrictions
whereby the total amount of FDI cannot be greater than a ￿xed fraction x of domes-
tic investors￿wealth W B, or it may stem from the need for local investors to enforce
dividend payments or to help exert control. Appendix A shows that foreign direct invest-
ments subject to complementarity requirements of the form F ￿ xW B may sometimes
de-stabilize an emerging market economy. Indeed, in contrast to the unrestricted FDI
case analyzed above, such direct investments ultimately will fall during slumps, that
is, when investors￿wealth W B
t+1 is experiencing a downturn. Downturns will also typ-
ically be deeper than in absence of FDI since, by amplifying the increase in pt during
booms, FDI increases production costs and thus accentuates the credit-crunch induced
on ￿rms. Thus, whilst unrestricted FDI has a stabilizing e⁄ect on an open emerging
market economy, opening such an economy to restricted FDI may actually have the
opposite e⁄ect.
5 Extensions and Policy Conclusions
The previous sections have analyzed a stylized model that illustrates how the interac-
tion between credit market imperfections and real exchange rate ￿ uctuations can cause
instability in some open economies. We have purposely abstracted from numerous fac-
tors making the analysis more realistic which could further a⁄ect the dynamics. In this
section we examine several directions in which our simple framework can be extended
and discuss policy implications.
5.1 Uncertainty and Defaults
The model presented above can easily be extended to incorporate random project returns
and defaults. We consider the case of a CES production function. With a risk of default
27from borrowers, lenders will charge a risk premium on their loans. If we denote the
interest rate on a risky loan by R, we have R > r where r is the international interest
rate (the interest rate in the absence of default risk); the risk premium is thus R ￿ r.
Suppose that the tradeable output technology is random, equal to e ￿￿f(K;zN) where
the ￿rm-speci￿c productivity shock e ￿ is uniformly distributed on the interval [￿;￿] and
is realized at the end of the period. The same will be true for the equilibrium gross
return generated by investors, namely:
e yT = max
zN
e ￿ ￿ f(I ￿ p ￿ zN;zN)
= e ￿ ￿  (pt)I;
where I = W B + L is the current ￿ ow of investment.
Now, if an entrepreneur defaults on his debt, it may be genuine because the revenue
￿ (p)I does not cover the repayment obligation on L (a ￿liquidity default￿ ), or it may
be deliberate when the entrepreneur chooses not to repay his debt despite the higher
chance of facing a penalty (a ￿strategic default￿ ). Consistent with our earlier mod-
elling approach, we assume strategic defaults are ex ante decisions whereby defaulting
borrowers sink a cost of c ￿ I to hide their investment funds I.
But now additional uncertainty about the productivity parameter e ￿ introduces the
possibility of ex post liquidity defaults, namely whenever e ￿ < ￿￿ where ￿￿ is de￿ned by
the zero pro￿t-condition:
￿
￿ (p)(W
B + L) ￿ RL = 0; (10)
where R is the repayment obligation speci￿ed in the loan contracts between lenders and
borrowers (borrowers are protected by limited liability, and therefore cannot be asked
to repay more than min(￿￿ (p)(W B + L);RL)):
Competition among lenders will set the equilibrium repayment schedule R so as to
make any lender indi⁄erent between making a (risky) loan on the domestic market and
28making a safe loan at rate r on the international credit market (R = r in the absence of
uncertainty). More formally:
rL =
Z ￿
￿
min(RL;e ￿ (p)(W
B + L))
d￿
￿ ￿ ￿
(11)
Appendix B shows that the number of defaulting ￿rms, equal to (￿￿ ￿ ￿)=(￿ ￿ ￿),
can be easily derived from (10) and (11). It is shown that this number is increasing in
p (and thus in W B) when entrepreneurs are credit constrained. Thus, the number of
defaults increases during periods of real appreciations, which in turn happen towards
the end of booms. This prediction appears to be consistent with available anecdotal
evidence on the dynamics of default rates in emerging market economies.24
Once a ￿rm defaults, it is often declared bankrupt. If we assume that bankruptcy is
declared one period after the default, then our model predicts a counter-cyclical number
of bankruptcies in equilibrium, with the highest number of bankrupted ￿rms being ob-
served in slumps. If we further assume that bankruptcies involve a substantial liquidation
or restructuring cost, borne by the entrepreneurial class in the following periods either
directly (disruption of supply chains, etc.) or indirectly (because the government needs
resources for the clean-up and taxes the entrepreneurs for them), then the slumps may
ultimately be signi￿cantly deeper and longer-lasting than what our benchmark model
predicts. Notice, however, that bankruptcy costs will signi￿cantly deepen the slumps
only in those economies facing credit constraints.
5.2 Amplifying Factors
Additional destabilizing factors of the kinds discussed in the recent literature on ￿nancial
crises, which in economies with highly developed ￿nancial systems would have little or
no impact on the dynamics of real economic activity, are likely to exacerbate output
volatility in economies with intermediate levels of ￿nancial development. In the model,
24See Mishkin (1996) for the case of Mexico, and World Bank (1997) for capital in￿ ows episodes.
29this implies that ￿ can be pro-cyclical. The following discussion is largely informal and
suggestive, as a more elaborated analysis would certainly require another paper.
5.2.1 Moral hazard on the lenders￿side
Suppose that the bulk of lending activities is performed by banks, which in turn are
regulated by the central bank or by the government. Now, in most countries (including
such developed countries as Japan or France) banking regulation is imperfect and what
we often observe over the cycle is that banks tend to overlend during booms. This in turn
may be due, either to an overload problem (there are too many lending opportunities
during booms and banks have limited time and attention to perform adequate screening
and monitoring on each project), or to an increase in bank competition25 (which in turn
may induce some banks to engage in preemptive lending). This tendency for banks
to overlend during booms can be easily captured in our model by assuming that the
credit-multiplier ￿ varies pro-cyclically. A small pro-cyclical variation of ￿ around
a given average ￿ would have no e⁄ect on the dynamics of wealth and output if ￿
is su¢ ciently large, in other words if the ￿nancial system is su¢ ciently developed.26
(For example, the S & L crisis did not produce major macroeconomic e⁄ects on the
U.S. economy.) However, if ￿ lies in the intermediate range for which the 45￿ line
intersects the wealth schedule W B
t+1(W B
t ) on its downward sloping part, then pro-cyclical
￿ uctuations of ￿ will obviously exacerbate volatility in the corresponding economy (as
overlending will magnify the price e⁄ect during booms). In other words, moral hazard
in the ￿nancial sector can be an important source of instability, but only in an economy
with an intermediate level of ￿nancial development.
25Competition may increase because of an increase in the volume of lending - loan o¢ cers who fail
to make lots of loans at time when everybody else is increasing lending, may fear that they will look
inept.
26When ￿ is su¢ ciently high the 45￿ line intersects the wealth schedule WB
t+1(WB
t ) on its rightward
upward sloping part, so that the dynamics of wealth is actually independent of ￿.
305.2.2 Investors￿overreactions to changes in fundamentals
Consider further a straightforward extension of our model with defaults in which foreign
investors have imperfect information about the e¢ ciency of creditors￿monitoring (and
therefore about the actual value of the credit-multiplier ￿).27 Then, suppose that the
economy experiences a negative but temporary productivity shock (i.e., a negative but
temporary shock to ￿) which will naturally have the e⁄ect of increasing the equilibrium
amount of defaults in the short-run. Now, given that the lenders are uncertain about
￿; if they do not observe the shock to ￿; they will not know whether to ascribe these
extra defaults to a change in ￿ or to lower value of ￿ - in other words, they will be
unsure of whether most of these are strategic defaults (suggesting incompetence of the
￿nancial sector) or rather liquidity defaults (associated with a shock to pro￿ts). As a
result they will respond in part by adjusting their assessment of ￿ downwards. From
then on, the comparison between an economy with a level of ￿nancial development (i.e.,
a high ￿) and an economy with an intermediate level of ￿nancial development (i.e., an
intermediate level of ￿) exactly parallels the previous case: if ￿ is high, the updating of ￿
will have no e⁄ect on the dynamics of wealth and output, since the 45￿ line intersects the
wealth schedule W B
t+1(W B
t ) on its third-upward-sloping part;28 on the other hand, if we
start from an economy at an intermediate level of ￿nancial development, the downward
updating in ￿ will prolong and amplify the initial e⁄ect of the temporary productivity
shock on ￿. This implies, for example, that the number of defaults can increase over
several periods.
Once again, the model tells us that overreactions by investors, as captured for exam-
ple in models which stress herd behavior, can only be source of substantial instability in
economies at a certain stage of ￿nancial development.
27For example, ￿nancial liberalization has just occurred and foreign investors cannot yet asses the
new monitoring cost c that should result from it.
28We implicitly assume that the updating on c, and therefore on ￿, is relatively small.
315.3 Some Policy Conclusions
Our model provides a simple and tractable framework for analyzing ￿nancially-based
crises in economies which are at an intermediate level of ￿nancial development. The
story we tell is based on some very basic features of these economies, in contrast with
other more institutionally-based theories which invoke moral hazard among lenders, herd
behavior among investors, etc. This is not to say that our model is inconsistent with this
class of theories￿ as shown in the previous subsections. However, our model does suggest
a somewhat di⁄erent policy response: slumps should be seen as part of a normal process
in economies like these which are both at an intermediate level of ￿nancial development
and in the process of liberalizing their ￿nancial sectors. We should therefore not over-
react to the occurrence of ￿nancial crises, especially in the case of emerging market
economies. In particular, hasty and radical overhauling of their economic system may
do more harm than good.29
Second, policies allowing ￿rms to rebuild their credit worthiness quickly will at the
same time contribute to a prompt recovery of the overall economy. In this context it is
worth considering the role for monetary policy and, more generally, for policies a⁄ecting
the credit market. Whilst our model in its present form cannot be directly used for this
purpose since money is neutral (and in any case the interest rate is ￿xed by the world
interest rate), it can be extended to allow for both monetary non-neutrality and a less
in￿nitely elastic supply of foreign loans (see Aghion-Bacchetta-Banerjee (2000, 2001a,
2004)). Once we take our framework in this direction it quickly becomes clear that a
29Indeed, if our model is right, the slump sets in motion forces which, even with little interference,
should eventually bring growth back to these economies. The risk is that by trying to overhaul the
system in a panic, one may actually undermine those forces of recovery instead of stimulating them.
This is not to deny that there is a lot that needs changing in these economies, especially on the
institutional side with the establishment and enforcement of disciplinary rules in credit and banking
activities. For example, in the context of our model, banks may typically engage in preemptive lending
to speculators in domestic inputs and/or to producers during booms. This in turn will further increase
output volatility whenever inadequate monitoring and expertise acquisition by banks increases aggregate
risk and therefore the interest rate imposed upon domestic producers.
32low interest rate policy is not necessarily the right answer even in a slump induced by a
credit crunch. The problem is that while such an interest rate reduction may help restore
the ￿rms￿￿nancial health (and therefore their investment capacity), the net obligations
of those who have borrowed in foreign currency will also rise if it leads to a devaluation
of the domestic currency. Therefore, the optimal interest rate policy ex post during a
￿nancial crisis cannot be determined without knowing more about the details of the
currency composition of the existing debt obligations of domestic enterprises.
This emphasis on creditworthiness as the key element in the recovery from a slump,
also suggests that a policy of allowing insolvent banks to fail may in fact prolong the
slump if it restricts ￿rms￿ability to borrow (because of the comparative advantage of
banks in monitoring ￿rms￿activities30). If banks must be shut down, there should be
an e⁄ort to preserve their monitoring expertise on the relevant industries. Moreover, to
the extent that the government has to spend resources on restructuring and cleaning-up
after a spate of bankruptcies, it should avoid raising taxes during a slump since doing
so would further limit the borrowing capacity of domestic entrepreneurs and therefore
delay the subsequent recovery.
Third, our model also delivers ex ante policy implications for emerging market
economies not currently under a ￿nancial crisis. In particular: (i) an unrestricted ￿-
nancial liberalization may actually destabilize the economy and engender a slump that
would otherwise not have happened. If a major slump is likely to be costly even in the
long-run (because, for example, it sets in process destabilizing political forces), fully lib-
eralizing foreign capital ￿ ows and fully opening the economy to foreign lending may not
be a good idea at least until the domestic ￿nancial sector is su¢ ciently well-developed
(that is, until the credit-multiplier ￿ becomes su¢ ciently large); (ii) foreign direct in-
vestment does not destabilize. Indeed, as we have argued above, FDI is most likely
30See Diamond (1984).
33to come in during slumps when the relative price of the country-speci￿c factor is low;
furthermore, even if this price ends up ￿ uctuating when the economy is open to FDI,
these ￿ uctuations will only a⁄ect the distribution of pro￿ts between domestic and foreign
investors but not aggregate output. Therefore there is no cost a priori to allowing FDI
even at low levels of ￿nancial development;31 (iii) what brings about ￿nancial crises is
precisely the rise in the price of country speci￿c factors. If one of these factors (say, real
estate) is identi￿ed to play a key role in sparking a ￿nancial crisis, it would be sensible
to control its price, either directly or though controlling its speculative demand using
suitable ￿scal deterrents. This, and other important aspects in the design of stabiliza-
tion policies for emerging market economies, await future elaborations of the framework
developed in this paper.
31This strategy of allowing only FDI at early stages of ￿nancial development is in fact what most
developed countries have done, in particular in Europe where restrictions on cross-country capital
movements have only been fully removed in the late 1980￿ s whereas FDI to - and between - European
countries had been allowed since the late 1950￿ s.
34Appendix A:
The Analytics of Financial Liberalization
A) Liberalization to Foreign Lending
Here, we construct an example of an economy which, in the absence of foreign borrow-
ing and lending, would be asymptotically stable and actually converge to a permanent
boom, but which becomes permanently volatile once fully open to foreign borrowing and
lending. The analysis of the closed economy is similar to Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty
(1999).
More speci￿cally, consider an economy in which:
(a) The production technology is Leontief with an inelastic supply of the country-
speci￿c factor, that is: f(K;z) = min
￿
K
a ;z
￿
, a < 1, where K = I ￿ p ￿ z.
(b) Financial markets are initially closed to foreign capital in￿ ows so that the aggregate
supply of funds available to domestic investors, It, is now equal to the min of the
investment capacity (1+￿)W B
t and of total domestic savings W B
t +W L
t . That is:
It = minf(1 + ￿)W
B
t ;W
B
t + W
L
t g:
(c) Initially, at time t = 0, the investment capacity of domestic entrepreneurs exceeds
the total amount of domestic savings, so that ￿W B
0 > W L
0 (in the opposite case,
opening up to foreign borrowing and lending would have no e⁄ect on investment
and output in the domestic economy).
(d) We impose the following restrictions on the parameters of the economy:
(i) ￿ > 1
(ii) 1 ￿ ￿ < a
35(iii) W L
0 and W B
0 are less than c W =
(1￿￿)e
1￿(1￿￿) 1
a
(iv) c W < a
2Z.
We now show that a closed economy which satis￿es assumptions (a), (b), (c), (d), is
stable, with constant price pt ￿ 0 and constant interest rate rt ￿ 1
a, and wealth levels
W B
t and W L
t which both converge monotonically to c W as t ! 1.
First, assumption (c) implies that r0 = 1
a, and it also implies that I0 = W L
0 + W B
0 ;
assumptions (d)-(iii) and (d)-(iv) then imply that I0 < aZ , so that p0 = 0. Next, one
can show that at any date s, rs = 1
a and ps = 0. To see this, suppose that for all s ￿ t,
rs = 1
a and ps = 0, and let us show that rt+1 = 1
a and pt+1 = 0. If rs = 1
a and ps = 0 for
all s ￿ t, then for all s ￿ t the wealth levels W L
s+1 and W B
s+1 satisfy the equations:
W
L
s+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
e +
1
a
W
L
s
￿
((1)s)
and
W
B
s+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
e +
1
a
W
B
s
￿
: ((2)s)
It then follows from assumption (d)-(i), i.e., from ￿ > 1, and from assuming that rt = 1
a
(which implies that ￿W B
t > W L
t ), that ￿W B
t+1 > W L
t+1 and therefore rt+1 = 1
a. Further-
more, it follows from assumption (d)-(iii) and equations (1)s and (2)s for s ￿ t, that
W L
s < c W and W B
s < c W for all s ￿ t + 1; this in turn implies that:
It+1 = W
L
t+1 + W
B
t+1 < 2c W;
so that It+1 < aZ by assumption (d)-(iv) and therefore pt+1 = 0. We have thus shown
that if rs = 1
a and ps = 0 for all s ￿ t, then rt+1 = 1
a and pt+1 = 0. Together with the
fact that r0 = 1
a and p0 = 0, this proves by induction that rs = 1
a and ps = 0 for all s, so
that the entire wealth trajectory
￿
W L
s ;W B
s
￿
is determined by
￿
W L
0 ;W B
0
￿
together with
the dynamic equations (1)s and (2)s. But this, together with assumption (d)-(ii), implies
that the equilibrium trajectory
￿
W L
s ;W B
s
￿
is stable, with both W L
s and W B
s converging
36monotonically towards c W when t ! 1. Thus, a closed economy characterized by (a)-(d)
will display no volatility in price, interest rate, wealth and (tradeable) output.
Now, a closed economy that satis￿es (a)-(d) and therefore is stable, may end up
becoming volatile if fully open to foreign borrowing and lending. For example, this will
be the case if that same economy satis￿es the su¢ cient conditions provided in Section 2.2
for the existence of two-cycles. And one can easily verify that the two sets of conditions
are consistent, in the sense that there exists a non-empty set of parameters which satisfy
both sets of conditions simultaneously.
B) Restricted FDI
Let F denote the current amount of FDI, and let us impose the constraint: F ￿ xW B,
with the fraction x being initially small. We assume that foreign investors receive their
proportional share of output and that this is always larger than their reservation return
r + ￿ (given the constraint x, the supply is no longer fully elastic as in the preceding
case). The equilibrium price for the country-speci￿c factor is now equal to:
pt = max(0;
(1 + ￿)(W B
t + Ft) ￿ aZ
Z
):
Let Lt = ￿(W B
t + Ft): Then the dynamics of investors￿wealth is described by the
equations:
(I) W
B
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
e +
1
a
(W
B
t + Ft + Lt) ￿ e rLt
￿
when W B
t is small and therefore pt ￿ 0 (part 1 of the W B
t+1(W B
t ) curve), and:
(II) W
B
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
e +
Z
1 + x
￿ e rLt
￿
when there is excess demand for the country-speci￿c factor and therefore pt becomes
positive (part 2 of the W B
t+1(W B
t ) curve).
(In (I) and (II) the variable e r denotes the domestic interest rate, which is equal to ￿
if ￿(W B + F) < W L and to the pro￿t rate otherwise.
37For x su¢ ciently small, we have Fs = xW B
s so that the above equation (II) implies
a total level of direct investment (domestic and foreign) equal to:
W
B
t+1 + xW
B
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
e(1 + x) + Z ￿ e r￿W
B
t (1 + x)
2￿
;
which for e small is decreasing in x. In particular, starting from an economy without
any FDI, introducing highly constrained FDI may end up deepening the slump which it
was meant to eliminate.
38Appendix B: Uncertainty and Defaults
Here we derive the number of defaulting ￿rms when there is ￿rm-speci￿c uncertainty.
Deriving RL from (10) and substituting into (11) gives:
rL =
 (p)(W B + L)
￿ ￿ ￿
Z ￿
￿
min(￿
￿;￿)d￿ (12)
The number of defaulting ￿rms, (￿￿￿￿)=(￿￿￿), can be derived from (12). When ￿rms
are credit constrained, we can use the fact that L=(W B + L) = ￿=r and get:
￿
￿ = ￿ ￿
s
(￿ ￿ ￿)[￿ + ￿ ￿
2￿
 (p)
]
Thus, ￿￿ depends positively on p and so does the number of defaulting ￿rms. Since p is
a positive function of W B;￿￿ depends also positively on W B. On the other hand, when
entrepreneurs are unconstrained the numbers of defaults depends negatively on W B (the
larger the wealth, the smaller the probability of defaults). In that case we have:
￿
￿ = ￿ ￿
r
(￿ ￿ ￿)[￿ + ￿ ￿
2(I ￿ W B)
I
]
where I is determined by the world interest rate r.
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